2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.: General
10 June 2010

Original: English

Main Committee I

Summary record (partial)* of the 2nd meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 11 May 2010, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Chidyausiku ..... (Zimbabwe)
later: Ms. Barbulescu ..... (Romania)
later: Mr. Chidyausiku ..... (Zimbabwe)

Contents

General exchange of views (*continued*)

* No summary record was prepared for the rest of the meeting.

This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent *within one week of the date of this document* to the Chief, Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza.

Any corrections to the record of this meeting and of other meetings will be issued in a corrigendum.

10-35746 (E)



Please recycle

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

General exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **Mr. van den IJssel** (Netherlands) said that many developments and initiatives came together at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, each with the potential to reinforce the other. The conclusion of a new treaty on strategic arms reduction by the United States of America and the Russian Federation reflected the commitment of both countries to reducing their nuclear arsenals. He also welcomed the steps taken by some nuclear-weapon States to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies, in line with obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and commitments made, in particular, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

2. Disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing. The existence of nuclear-weapon States should not be an excuse for further nuclear proliferation. Intensified efforts to disarm would strengthen non-proliferation standards in the interest of all: the risks of a world with nuclear weapons were the same for all States. Furthermore, the fact that nuclear-weapon States were primarily responsible for disarmament did not relieve non-nuclear-weapon States of their responsibility to contribute to the process.

3. Parliaments and public opinion were urging States parties to make progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons. To that end, bringing about the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and initiating negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty would be imperative.

4. The Review Conference should confirm and strengthen the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility of disarmament. In that connection, his country welcomed the disclosure by the United States of America of the number of nuclear weapons in its possession. States parties should also apply those guiding principles in committing themselves to the reduction and final elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons, a commitment that the Conference must reaffirm. It was promising that the Russian Federation and the United States of America had indicated their willingness to include non-strategic nuclear weapons in future disarmament negotiations.

5. **Mr. Benítez Versón** (Cuba) said that, rather than limit itself to reaffirming past commitments, the Conference must adopt concrete measures that would contribute to nuclear disarmament, an objective that could no longer be postponed indefinitely. It was incumbent upon nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations leading to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, in fulfilment of their Treaty obligations under article VI. In that respect, the signing of a new treaty on strategic arms reduction by the Russian Federation and the United States of America, while a step in the right direction, must neither breed complacency nor divert attention from the fundamental goal of total elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons. The existence of security doctrines based on so-called "nuclear deterrence" and on the modernization of nuclear arsenals was unacceptable. Likewise, Cuba called for an immediate halt in nuclear-weapon States' deployment of nuclear weapons within the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States. It was also high time to put an end to the policy of double standards and selectivity favoured by certain States, which singled out developing States' alleged failure to comply with non-proliferation obligations while enhancing their own nuclear arsenals.

6. The Committee and its subsidiary body must therefore consider, as a matter of priority, the following measures. An in-depth examination of the status of implementation of commitments agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, including the 13 practical steps, must be undertaken in order to determine the reasons behind the failure to implement those commitments and to agree on a corrective course of action. It would also be necessary to initiate negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, before 2025, and for the adoption of a nuclear-weapons convention. In the interim, States parties must conclude a legally binding international instrument under which nuclear-weapon States committed to refrain from the use or threat of use of such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Lastly, States must begin negotiating a non-discriminatory, multilateral and verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty.

7. **Ms. Higgie** (New Zealand), speaking in her national capacity, said that her country had been heartened by several positive developments in the context of overall progress towards nuclear disarmament since the previous Review Conference. While the Nuclear Posture Review recently announced

by the United States of America could have gone further in such areas as operational readiness, it was a significant step in the right direction, as was that country's renewed commitment to reducing the size and role of its nuclear arsenal. She also welcomed the conclusion by the Russian Federation and the United States of America of a new treaty on strategic arms reduction, and in particular both countries' recognition that the treaty marked the beginning of a process leading to further reductions. She urged both nuclear Powers to recall the agreement in 2000 that the principle of irreversibility must apply to nuclear disarmament measures. In addition, other nuclear-weapon States had taken steps to implement their article VI obligations, and the Secretary-General had issued a five-point plan for progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

8. Despite those positive developments, the world continued to live in the shadow of nuclear weapons, 40 years after the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Review Conference provided an excellent opportunity to pursue tangible progress towards both reducing the number of nuclear weapons and diminishing their role in security strategies. One way to diminish that role would be to lower their operational readiness.

9. New Zealand continued to call on States that had not yet ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to do so without delay. In that respect, it welcomed the declarations of intent to consider ratification recently made by the United States of America and Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea's announcement that it would ratify shortly. Her country shared the frustration expressed at the lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament towards the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty, and stood ready to work towards achieving consensus on starting negotiations, though its patience was not infinite.

10. Despite the encouraging willingness of some nuclear-weapon States to increase the transparency of their nuclear arsenals by providing information about their nuclear holdings, the current ad hoc approach to reporting did not serve the Non-Proliferation Treaty well. In that connection, New Zealand was pleased to join with Australia to promote an initiative on a more systematic approach to article VI reporting, which it strongly believed would foster a climate conducive to further progress on disarmament.

11. Speaking on behalf of Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria and Switzerland, the members of a cross-regional initiative on lowering the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems known as the De-Alerting Group, she said that the issue had first been given clear expression in one of the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. In accepting that step, the nuclear-weapon States had undertaken to institute concrete agreed measures to that end.

12. The Group had made the issue of operational readiness the subject of a series of General Assembly resolutions. It had also pursued a constructive dialogue with the nuclear-weapon States at the ministerial level and tabled a working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.10) through which it sought to ensure that the final product of the Conference would contain a commitment by those countries to take concrete steps to de-alert their nuclear weapons. The working paper urged States parties to call on the nuclear-weapon States to report regularly on those steps.

13. While mindful of the varying levels of operational readiness among nuclear-weapon States and of the fact that imbalances in military arsenals might hinder progress towards widespread de-alerting, the Group insisted that nuclear-weapon States must find ways to overcome those issues if they were serious in seeking a safer world.

14. **Mr. Badr** (Egypt), speaking in his national capacity, said that nuclear disarmament was one of his country's main foreign policy objectives, out of its conviction that international peace and security could never be fully attained as long as nuclear weapons existed. In accordance with article VI of the Treaty and the 13 practical steps, nuclear-weapon States must undertake time-bound, irreversible measures to achieve nuclear disarmament.

15. Welcoming the signing of a new treaty on strategic arms reduction by the United States of America and the Russian Federation, he looked forward to ratification of the treaty and hoped that it would be followed by further steps towards arms reduction on the part of all nuclear-weapon States. However, unilateral and bilateral efforts alone would leave thousands of nuclear weapons deployed and could therefore not replace collective measures by those States to fully implement NPT obligations within the multilateral framework. Furthermore, retaining a

deterrent role for nuclear weapons was especially counterproductive to non-proliferation objectives, as were nuclear sharing and basing nuclear weapons in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, in contravention of article I of the Treaty.

16. Egypt viewed with alarm attempts to link nuclear disarmament efforts to preconditions, such as the establishment of a certain political situation or the implementation of additional non-proliferation-related commitments by non-nuclear-weapon States. Such requirements illogically placed the onus of nuclear disarmament on those States. His country reiterated its call on the nuclear-weapon States to comply fully with their legal obligations under the Treaty and to initiate multilateral negotiation of a nuclear-weapons convention.

17. The Review Conference should reaffirm the urgent need to implement the 13 practical steps, which represented an internationally endorsed plan to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In the interim, nuclear-weapon States must give non-nuclear-weapon States comprehensive, unequivocal, unconditional and legally binding negative security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, in line with the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons and decision 2 on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. There was a need to initiate negotiation of an international instrument to provide such assurances as soon as possible, with a view to furthering non-proliferation objectives and bolstering the Treaty's credibility. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon States should also undertake measures to de-alert their nuclear arsenals, refrain from increasing the yield of their nuclear warheads and avoid developing new types of nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear warheads.

18. Speaking on behalf of the members of the New Agenda Coalition, namely, Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, he introduced the Coalition's working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.8), which drew on all previous working papers submitted during the current review cycle. The working paper contained a wide range of practical recommendations for achieving nuclear disarmament. The fact that it encompassed the views of a cross-regional group of countries should increase the likelihood of reaching consensus on the elements contained therein.

19. **Mr. Ali** (Malaysia) said that despite the positive developments of the previous few months, States parties had collectively failed to make the progress towards nuclear disarmament envisaged by the Treaty and by previous review conferences. Therefore, it would be necessary to revitalize the Treaty by reaffirming and implementing past commitments.

20. Nuclear disarmament remained his country's highest priority, given its conviction that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only way to avoid their use or threat of use. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference had agreed that the indefinite extension of the Treaty did not accord nuclear-weapon States the privilege of possessing nuclear weapons in perpetuity. The benchmarks for nuclear disarmament contained in the 13 practical steps had yet to be met. Nuclear-weapon States should therefore take the lead by fulfilling all relevant commitments within a specific time frame and working towards the conclusion of a convention on nuclear weapons. In that context, while the treaty on strategic arms reduction recently concluded by the Russian Federation and the United States of America was a welcome development, Malaysia viewed it as part of the fulfilment of nuclear-weapon States' long overdue disarmament obligations. Cuts in deployments were no substitute for irreversible reductions aimed at the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

21. Noting the tendency to place non-proliferation compliance above disarmament compliance — evidence of the selectivity and double standards that had weakened the Treaty — he stressed that tangible progress within Main Committee I hinged on placing equal emphasis on both pillars as mutually reinforcing aims.

22. Malaysia remained gravely concerned at the ongoing deployment of nuclear weapons at high levels of readiness, and strongly believed that taking nuclear weapons off alert was a practical qualitative step that complemented the quantitative step of reduction. In addition, efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States must be undertaken as a matter of priority. In that regard, he welcomed the pledge by the United States of America in its Nuclear Posture Review to refrain from use or threat of use of

nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States that were in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations, and expressed the hope that that declaration of intent would motivate other nuclear-weapon States to follow suit and renew discussions of negative security assurances at the Review Conference.

23. The 2010 Conference should provide an example to other disarmament forums, in particular the Conference on Disarmament, which he hoped would make progress towards starting negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. Malaysia also endorsed the decision to re-establish an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances with a mandate to negotiate in the Conference on Disarmament. Moreover, it supported efforts to bring into force the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as well as the continuation of the nuclear-weapon States' moratorium on nuclear testing.

24. *Ms. Barbulescu (Romania), Vice-Chairman, took the chair.*

25. **Mr. Belaoura** (Algeria) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as the proper framework for efforts to contain the gravest threat facing humanity, required the full implementation of all its provisions, together with all the related commitments assumed at the previous Review Conferences. The current Conference, held in the context of renewed interest in the nuclear weapons zero option, should draw on that momentum to adopt recommendations and a plan of action on all the issues before it, while maintaining the necessary balance between the three pillars of the Treaty and without discriminating between the interests of the States parties.

26. He welcomed the new arms reduction treaty concluded between the United States and the Russian Federation; it would, however, have a greater impact if it formed part of an effort to achieve nuclear disarmament rather than merely manage the nuclear threat. He called on other nuclear-weapon States to take similar steps to reduce their nuclear arsenals, noting their special responsibility in that regard. Ultimately, however, nothing short of the complete elimination of such weapons would be acceptable.

27. He called on the Conference to adopt a robust plan to that effect, including practical, gradual, complementary measures, with short, medium and long timelines, and to provide for a follow-up mechanism in order to monitor implementation of commitments. The plan of action should give priority to the conclusion of a treaty banning fissile material for weapons purposes through the commencement of substantive discussions in the Conference on Disarmament within a reasonable time frame; it should also urge the rapid entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Ratification by nine annex 2 countries was holding it hostage; his delegation welcomed the undertakings given by two of them, Indonesia and the United States, to ratify that instrument and called on the others to follow suit.

28. Pending complete disarmament, nuclear-weapon States should seek to reduce and eventually eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their defence and security strategies and give security assurances to other States; the scope and content of such assurances should be unchanging and they should not be subject to geographical limits. The Conference should accordingly reiterate the request for the conclusion of an international instrument to that effect.

29. *Mr. Chidyausiku (Zimbabwe), Chairman, resumed the Chair.*

30. **Ms. Laose** (Nigeria) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the key barrier against nuclear disorder and, for that reason, was the most widely accepted multilateral disarmament agreement in history. Nigeria remained committed to its objectives and welcomed the recent positive developments in the international security climate. Recalling her country's arguments against the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995, she said that it had become clear that a set time frame needed to be established so that what had been achieved over the 40 previous years would not be lost. The 2010 Conference should build on the recent progress towards nuclear disarmament and adopt concrete measures for a realistic international agenda in that area within a reasonable time frame. The only way to sustain the momentum created by the recent positive actions by the United States and the Russian Federation was to set timelines and benchmarks for targets to be attained.

31. **Mr. Tajouri** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that one concern of his country, reiterated during the general debate and in its working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.12) and which his delegation wished to see reflected in the final document of the Conference, was that all nuclear-weapon States should

place their nuclear installations under the IAEA safeguards regime as part of a negotiated agreement with that Agency. It would thereby be possible to verify their compliance with their commitment to general and complete disarmament under article VI of the Treaty. He called on those States to follow the example set by his country, which had discontinued its nuclear weapons programme in 2003.

32. **Mr. Wang** Qun (China) said that the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons was one of the main aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the common aspiration of all peace-loving peoples. Broad progress in its implementation depended on a stable international security environment through efforts by all States to address the security concerns of other States within an appropriate international legal framework; transparent, irreversible and verifiable reductions in the nuclear arsenals of nuclear-weapon States; early entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty and the rapid commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for the purposes of weapons; adoption of a legally binding instrument to ensure the adoption of a no-first-use policy by nuclear-weapon States, which should also reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies; implementation of the commitment of those States not to target their nuclear weapons against any country; withdrawal by the States concerned of their nuclear installations in other countries; and a multilateral discussion on a verifiable, long-term plan of phased action for disarmament, including a binding instrument on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and a multilateral treaty to ban the arms race in outer space.

33. China was unique among nuclear-weapon States in that it had always implemented its obligations under the Treaty in good faith and in a transparent manner. It applied a no-first-use policy, thereby ensuring that its weapons, which it kept to the minimum required for its own security, presented no threat to other countries; it did not deploy those weapons in other countries and it would not use them against non-nuclear-weapon States or in nuclear-weapon free zones. China supported the early entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty and, until then, continuation of the moratorium on nuclear tests; it likewise supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In conclusion, he drew attention to his country's working paper on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.64) and expressed the hope that its content would be duly reflected in the final document.

34. **Mr. Valero** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) said that, as a traditionally peaceful country committed to a nuclear-free world, Venezuela called for an open and transparent exchange of ideas on ways of containing the nuclear threat. Despite their binding Treaty obligations, some States continued to develop their nuclear arsenals as part of their strategic security policies and even to consider using them against other States. Nuclear-weapon States bore the main responsibility for the reduction and elimination of such weapons; good-faith negotiations to that end were an essential means of building peace. Owing to a lack of the political will on the part of some of those States, indefinite extension of the Treaty had not had the expected result of bringing disarmament closer or of advancing implementation of the 13 practical steps. The current Review Conference therefore offered a welcome opportunity to reaffirm the States parties' commitment to the objectives of the Treaty through the adoption of a plan of action for nuclear disarmament, as proposed by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, setting out measurable and achievable stages to that end within a set time frame. There was an immediate need for a legally binding instrument that would provide non-nuclear-weapon States with negative security assurances; such an instrument would not only contribute to non-proliferation but also advance the universalization of the Treaty.

35. **Mr. Kongstad** (Norway) said that the Treaty was as much about disarmament as non-proliferation. Its indefinite extension in 1995 and the subsequent adoption, in 2000, of 13 practical steps had served to strengthen States parties' disarmament obligations. The sixth step, in particular, entailed an unequivocal commitment by nuclear-weapon States to the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Accordingly, for the 2010 Review Conference to be successful, it needed both to build on and go beyond the compact from 1995 and 2000. That meant remedying the absence of timelines for the establishment of a robust and credible disarmament and non-proliferation regime beyond the entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty and the conclusion within five years of a fissile material cut-off treaty, both of which were still pending. An action plan for nuclear disarmament was called for, with clear benchmarks and deadlines. The Conference must reconfirm the States parties' determination to take

practical steps to achieve a nuclear-free world and agree on a concrete programme of work covering all three pillars of the Treaty up to 2015.

36. Norway welcomed reductions in nuclear arsenals, whether decided unilaterally or, as recently, between two States, the United States and the Russian Federation, which his delegation called on to continue their talks with a view to the inclusion of all categories of nuclear weapons, including tactical ones, in the nuclear arms control and disarmament processes. His country had joined a number of such initiatives. All nuclear-weapon States should be similarly involved, since all were equally subject to the obligation of disarmament; likewise, they should follow the recent welcome example of the United States in ensuring full transparency.

37. In order to build confidence that disarmament was taking place, verification was important; non-nuclear-weapon States should also be part of that process, in accordance with their obligations under the Treaty. Moreover, progress towards disarmament implied a halt to the development of new categories of nuclear weapons; there must be no new nuclear arms race. It was therefore imperative to secure the early entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty. As for the projected fissile material cut-off treaty, long considered the next step in the multilateral nuclear disarmament process and which should also address the issue of existing stocks, the current impasse in the related work of the Conference on Disarmament called into question the usefulness of that forum.

38. Pending full elimination of nuclear weapons, it was important to reduce their role in security policies and to build on the current encouraging trend towards a further strengthening of negative security assurances. More also needed to be done to lower the operational readiness of nuclear weapons, which was a matter of concern to everyone and could not be left to nuclear-weapon States alone to deal with. One last topic that was of increasing relevance was that of an additional legal instrument to regulate the nuclear-weapon-free world to which all the States parties to the Treaty aspired, as the ultimate expression of their commitments under article VI. To that end, thought would also need to be given to nuclear weapons in the context of international humanitarian law.

The discussion covered in the summary record ended at 11.40 a.m.